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"[There are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also
know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some
things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns-the ones
we don't know we don't know."'
-Donald Rumsfeld
I.

INTRODUCTION

For injuries occurring on or after October 1, 2013, "mentalmental, 2 claims have become compensable workers' compensation
t Mr. Atchison is an associate attorney with Heacox, Hartman, Koshmrl,
Cosgriff &.Johnson, P.A. Mr. Atchison joined the firm in February 2015 and his
practice involves defending employers and insurers in workers' compensation
matters. Mr. Atchison is a graduate of the University of Minnesota, BA, and
William Mitchell College of Law, JD.
1.
Sec'y of Def. Donald H. Rumsfeld, News Briefing of the Department of
Defense (Feb. 12, 2002), available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts
/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636.
2.
"Mental-mental" injuries are defined as mental injuries caused by mental
stimulus. See, e.g., Frame v. Resort Serv., Inc., 593 S.E.2d 491, 495 ("A mentalmental injury is a purely mental injury resulting from emotional stimuli." (citing
Shealy v. Aiken Cnty., 535 S.E.2d 438, 442 (2000)));James M. Inman, Note, Where
Are You Hurt? Kentucky Redefines Workers' Compensation Injury in a Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder World, 96 KY. L.J. 465, 474 (2008) (defining mental-mental workers'
compensation cases as those "where a mental stimulus causes a mental or nervous
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injuries in Minnesota. In light of this change, many employers,
insurers, and the attorneys who represented them have become
concerned about how the new law might increase expenses and
exposure associated with handling and defending those claims.
While the added expense is a significant concern, many clients are
just as worried about the scope of the new law. These changes give
employers, insurers, and the attorneys who represent them great
pause about the future of workers' compensation law in Minnesota:
Will having a bad day at work now be a compensable workers'
compensation claim? What about anxiety associated with a
particularly stressful day or work environment? Employers and
insurers want to know where the line will be drawn between
normal, unavoidable stress and legitimate, work-related mental
injuries.
The statutory changes, however, are by no means radical, nor
were the changes unexpected. To begin, the changes are narrow,
limiting compensability to diagnoses of post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD).' Moreover, recent decisions from the workers'
compensation courts have indicated that the old law completely
banning mental-mental injuries was based on an outdated
5
understanding of mental impairments and should be reexamined.
Understanding the statutory changes, the reasoning behind the
changes, and the limitations within the new law will allow attorneys
practicing in the area of workers' compensation to advise clients on
compensability of this new category of injuries, particularly
attorneys who practice defense work.

injury...").
3.
4.

SeeMINN. STAT. § 176.011, subdiv. 16 (2014).
Id. § 176.011, subdiv. 15(d).

See, e.g., Craig B. Nichols, Work-Related Mental Injuries: Minnesota's
5.
Compensability Standards, 22 HAMLINE L. REv. 259, 261 (1998) (explaining that,

under contemporaneous Minnesota workers' compensation law, the mental
injuries needed to be related to a physical injury in order to be considered
compensable by a court); Adam Tucker, Note, A Matter of Fairness:How Denying
Mental-Mental Claims Frustratesthe Central Purpose of Workers' Compensation Law, 31 J.

MED. 467 (2010) (discussing the development of mental-mental claims in
American jurisprudence and the policy obstacles preventing full recognition of
mental impairments as compensable injuries).
LEGAL
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THE LOCKWOOD ERA

For years, mental-mental injuries were non-compensable
workers' compensation claims in Minnesota.6 Furthermore, the bar
on mental-mental claims seemed to be absolute.' However, as
mental impairments have become less stigmatized, the
understanding of mental injuries has grown. Gone is the outdated
notion that a mental injury alone is not an actual or compensable
injury. As evidenced in Dodds v. Red Lake School District IDS #38,
Minnesota workers' compensation law has not been immune from
these developments. s Additionally, this evolved understanding of
mental injuries was recently codified into law.'
In 1981, Minnesota first considered the compensability of
mental-mental injuries in Lockwood v. Independent School District No.
877.10 Ronald Lockwood, a high school principal, claimed a workrelated manic-depressive disorder." Over a three-year period, he
alleged that his job duties expanded significantly, resulting in
increased nervousness and an "inabilit to control his temper,"
which he took out on the students." He eventually took an
extended medical leave of absence and began to see a psychiatrist. l
At the workers' compensation hearing, the treating psychiatrist
testified that, while manic-depressive disorder requires a genetic
predisposition, "stress triggers the biochemical reaction causing the
disorder."' 4 He opined that "the stress of Lockwood's job caused his
mental disorder."'l Based on this testimony, both the compensation
court and the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA)

6.
See Lockwood v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 877, 312 N.W.2d 924, 926 (Minn.
1981) (holding that Minnesota's workers' compensation statute did not allow
compensation for purely mental injuries).
7.
See id. ("We are unwilling . . . to construe our statute as affording
workers' compensation coverage for mental disability caused by work-related stress
without physical trauma because we are unable to determine that the legislature
ever intended to provide such coverage.").
8.
Dodds v. Red Lake Sch. Dist. IDS # 38, No. 9588989 (Minn. Office
Admin. Hearings Feb. 27, 2009) (findings and order).
9.
See MINN. STAT. § 176.011, subdiv. 16.
10.
Lockwood, 312 N.W.2d 924.
11.
Id. at 924-25.
12.
Id.

13.

Id.at 925.

14.
15.

Id.
Id.
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held that Lockwood's manic-depressive disorder "arose out of and
in the course of his employment" and awarded benefits.
7
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the WCCA.1 In its
decision, the court recognized three categories of mental injury
claims." The first category is the "physical-mental" injury, where a
9
work-related physical injury causes a mental impairment. The
second is the "mental-physical" injury, where a work-related mental
stress causes a physical injury. 2° Workers' compensation coverage
2
had already been extended to these types of injuries. The third
category, the "mental-mental" injury, involves a mental injury
caused by work-related mental stimulus and had never been
addressed in Minnesota. While a majority of other jurisdictions
had already held mental-mental injuries to be compensable, the
Minnesota Supreme Court in Lockwood was unwilling to extend
coverage to such a claim absent a clearly expressed legislative intent
21
to do so. In effect, the court concluded that mental-mental
injuries were outside the scope of the Minnesota Workers'24
Compensation Act, and therefore, were not compensable injuries.
For many years after Lockwood, a worker who had a mental
impairment but lacked the corresponding physical injury was
ineligible for workers' compensation benefits.
So began the Lockwood Era, wherein all mental-mental claims
were denied workers' compensation coverage. In 1987, the
Minnesota Supreme Court was offered the opportunity to overrule
16.

Id.

17.
18.
19.

Id. at 927.
See id. at 926.
Id. (citing Hartman v. Cold Spring Granite Co., 243 Minn. 264, 67

N.W.2d 656 (1954)); see also Natalie D. Riley, Mental-Mental Claims-Placing
Limitations on Recovery Under Workers' Compensationfor Day-to-Day Frustrations,65 Mo.

L. REV. 1023, 1030-31 (2000) (defining "physical-mental claims" as those that
"involve injuries that lead to disabling psychological repercussions").
Lockwood, 312 N.W.2d at 926 (citing Aker v. State, Dep't of Natural Res.,
20.
282 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. 1979)); see also Riley, supra note 19, at 1031 (defining
"mental-physical claims" as those that "involve mental stimuli that result in physical
disabilities").
See Aker, 282 N.W.2d at 536 (providing compensation to the widow of a
21.
man who suffered a heart attack caused by work-related stress); Hartman, 243
Minn. at 278, 67 N.W.2d at 664 (awarding compensation to a man who developed
neurosis as a result of injuries sustained while working).
22. Lockwood, 312 N.W.2d at 926-27.
23. Id. at 927.
24.

Id.
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Lockwood in Johnson v. Paul's Auto & Truck Sales, Inc.2 5 The court
declined to do so because, despite a major revision of the Workers'
Compensation Act in 1983 and subsequent legislative sessions, "the
legislature ha[d] given no indication of an intent to make [mentalmental injuries] compensable." Johnson, in fact, slightly expanded
the Lockwood doctrine, holding that the mere "presence of physical
symptoms"" (facial tics, hand tremors, profuse sweating), which are
manifestations of the mental disorder, do not automatically convert
a mental-mental injury into a compensable mental-physical claim.2
Following Lockwood and Johnson, the bar on mental-mental claims in
the Lockwood Era was seemingly absolute. 29
However, in recent years, the steadfast authority of Lockwood
has been questioned. In February 2009, a workers' compensation
administrative law judge heard Dodds v. Red Lake School District IDS
#38, which began the erosion of the Lockwood doctrine. 0 Michelle
Dodds was a teacher at Red Lake High School when a sixteen-yearold student broke into her classroom and fatally shot five students
and another teacher before turning the gun on himself. There
was no dispute that as a result of the incident, Dodds developed
severe PTSD, anxiety, and depression. 32 Dodds
was
S
33 herself
physically unharmed during the classroom violence. The question
was whether her mental injuries resulted in a physical injury and
therefore, a compensable workers' compensation claim. 34 Based on
expert testimony, the judge found that because of the extreme
mental stress and ongoing PTSD, the circuitry of Dodds' brain had
been altered with abnormal chemical and electrical impulses, and

25.

Johnson v. Paul's Auto & Truck Sales, Inc., 409 N.W.2d 506 (Minn.

1987).
26. Id. at 509. ("[The injured] [e]mployee ...
overruled. This we decline to do.").

27.
28.

suggests that Lockwood be

Id.
See id. at 508-09.

29. See, e.g.,Jaakola v. Olympic Steel, Inc., 56 W.C.D. 238 (Minn. WCCA Nov.
19, 1996) (denying worker's claim for alleged mental injury after witnessing death
of a co-worker because plaintiff lacked requisite physical injury), affd, 560 N.W.2d
92 (Minn. 1997).

30.

Dodds v. Red Lake Sch. Dist. IDS # 38, No. 9588989 (Minn. Office

Admin. Hearings Feb. 27, 2009) (findings and order).

31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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these alterations were permanent. In other words, the PTSD
Dodds suffered from resulted in a physical injury to her brain,
rendering her claim compensable as a mental-physical injury.
The Dodds decision gave the defense attorneys great pause: had
clever plaintiffs' attorneys figured out how to get around the
physical injury requirement set forth in Lockwood? While mentalmental injuries were still non-compensable, suddenly there was
medical support for the theory that PTSD was a compensable
mental-physical injury.16 The WCCA, however, never heard the case
because it settled while on appeal and before an appellate decision
was issued. While Dodds did not create precedential case law
opening the mental-mental door that Lockwood had previously
slammed shut, it did reflect a more contemporary take on mental
injuries. In Dodds, mental injuries were not viewed simply as hurt
feelings. Rather, mental impairments were given a sort of
legitimacy previously reserved only for physical injuries. Like a
fractured spine or broken leg, certain mental injuries have serious,
lasting effects that are not made better by toughening up. With the
right set of facts, it seems entirely possible post-Dodds that an
appellate court could find mental-mental injuries compensable.
Recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court was given its turn to
7
consider the changing understanding of mental-mental claims. In
Schuette v. City of Hutchinson, Scott Schuette, a police officer,
responded to an emergency call at the local high school involving a
child with whom he was personally acquainted. She had fallen out
of a truck."9 Resuscitation attempts failed and she was pronounced
dead at the hospital.'0 Three years later, Schuette "was diagnosed
41
with PTSD" related to the incident.
At the workers' compensation hearing, conflicting medical
evidence was presented from a psychiatrist, a neuropsychologist,
and a clinical psychologist regarding whether PTSD was a mental
disability that resulted in a physical injury to the brain, as was
argued in Dodds.2 The compensation judge found PTSD to

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id.
See
See
Id.
See
See
See

Schuette v. City of Hutchinson, 843 N.W.2d 233 (Minn. 2014).
id. at 235.
id. at 235 n.1.
id. at 236.
id.; see also Dodds v. Red Lake Sch. Dist. IDS # 38, No. 9588989 (Minn.
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"represent[] a mental disability" that is not compensable under
Minnesota workers' compensation law.43 Schuette appealed and the
WCCA affirmed. 4' The opinion from the WCCA, however, strongly
suggested that PTSD should be a compensable injury.45 The court
referenced Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, noting that "modern

medical opinion no longer distinguishes between physical injuries
and nervous or mental injuries., 46 The court further stated,
"Notwithstanding the fact that Lockwood seems to be an increasingly
isolated position in workers' compensation law, it remains the
standard in Minnesota and this court reviews the present appeal in
accordance with that decision."47
Ultimately, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the WCCA,
noting that mental stimulus that results in a mental injury is not
compensable under Lockwood.4' The court concluded that the
compensation judge's finding that PTSD did not result in a physical
injury was "not manifestly contrary to the evidence. '49 Additionally,
the court declined to overturn Lockwood, implying that such a
change is a policy determination to be considered by the
legislature.o5

While the Schuette decision continues the black-letter law of
Lockwood, the appellate decision, particularly from the WCCA,
suggests that the policy considerations underlying its legal
conclusions-namely, that mental injuries alone are outside the
scope of compensable workers' compensation claims-may be
flawed. Importantly, the Minnesota state legislature shared this
51
concern.

Office Admin. Hearings Feb. 27, 2009) (findings and order).
43.
Schuette, 843 N.W.2d at 236.
44.
Id.
45.
Schuette v. City of Hutchinson, WC12-5486 (Minn. WCCA Apr. 18,
2013), available at http://mn.gov/workcomp/2013/Schuette-04-18-13.html.

46.

Id. (citing 4 LEx K.

LARSON

&

ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS'

COMPENSATION LAw § 56.04(1) (2013)).

47.

Id.

48.
49.
50.
51.

Schuette, 843 N.W.2d at 237.
Id. at 238.
Id. at 238-39.
SeeMINN. STAT.§ 176.011, subdivs. 15(d), 16 (2014).
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III. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES ENACTED MAY 2013
On May 16, 2013, Governor Dayton signed a bill into law that
included significant changes to the law regarding mental-mental
injuries. 2 Specifically, Minnesota Statutes section 176.011,
subdivision 16, was amended to read:
"Personal injury" means any mental impairment as
defined in subdivision 15, paragraph (d), or physical
injury arising out of and in the course of employment ....
Physical stimulus resulting in mental injury and mental
stimulus resulting in physical injury shall remain
compensable. Mental impairment is not considered a
personal injury if it results from a disciplinary action, work
evaluation, job transfer, layoff, demotion, promotion,
or similar action taken in good
termination, retirement,
53
faith by the employer.
Section 176.011, subdivision 15, paragraph (d) now reads:
For the purposes of this chapter, "mental impairment"
means a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder by a
licensed psychiatrist or psychologist. For the purpose of
this chapter, "post-traumatic stress disorder" means the
condition as described in the most recently published
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders by the American Psychiatric Association.
Similar changes were made to the definition of "occupational
disease."5 5 As most employees, employers, insurers, and defense
attorneys know, this dramatic alteration to the definition of
personal injury and occupational disease will change the course of
workers' compensation practice in Minnesota. Understanding the
new law and anticipating its effects will help attorneys practicing
workers' compensation in Minnesota properly defend mentalmental injuries.

IV. THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UNKNOWN
Naturally, there are a lot of concerns surrounding the new law,
particularly for defense attorneys. Undoubtedly, there will be an
52.
53.
54.
55.

See id.
Id. § 176.011, subdiv. 16.
Id. § 176.011, subdiv. 15(d).
See id. § 176.011, subdiv. 15(a).
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increase in the number of claims filed. This makes sense, as
coverage has been extended to a type of injury previously barred.
Beyond the simple increase in claims, employers and insurers may
also have concerns about the costs associated with defending these
new claims. For example, just as most claims involving a physical
injury require an independent medical examination, mentalmental claims will likely require an independent psychological
examination.
There may also be a deluge of initial "frivolous" claims, which
will test the boundaries of the new law by alleging mental injuries
that do not necessarily rise to the level of PTSD. These claims may
include work-related depression, anxiety, or humiliation resulting
from minor events, rather than exposure to traumatic events. While
these boundary-pushing claims may ultimately be dismissed, they
will have to be thoroughly and competently defended. This is
particularly true for the next few years, as the new law finds its
footing and the judicial parameters are framed. Defense firms may
also have to place added focus on employment law, or hire outside
counsel, as there will likely also be claims testing the limitations of
the exclusion for good faith actions taken by the employer.
There are also problems with the way the new law defines
PTSD. As indicated, Minnesota Statutes section
176.011,
subdivision 15 makes the "most recently published edition" of the
American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (DSM) the defining authority.56 The fifth edition
of the DSM (DSM-V) was just published on May 18, 2013, two days
after Governor Dayton signed the new law into effect. 57' And, as if on
cue, it contained major revisions to the definition of PTSD. 5s The
change most relevant to the field of workers' compensation was the
addition of PTSD that results from "repeated or extreme exposure
to aversive details of the traumatic events(s) ....
,,53 The DSM-V
56.
Id. § 176.011, subdiv. 15(d) ("For the purposes of this chapter, 'posttraumatic stress disorder' means the condition as described in the most recently
published edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders by
the American Psychiatric Association."). See generally DSM, AM. PSYCHATIC AWS'N,
http://www.psychiatiy.org/practice/dsm (last visited Apr. 24, 2015).
57.
See Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, DSM-5 Overview: The Future Manual, DSM-5
DEv., http://www.dsm5.org/about/Pages/DSMVOverview.aspx (last visited Apr.
24, 2015).
58.
Id.
59.
AM. PSYCHIATRIc ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENrAL
DISORDERS 271 (5th ed. 2013).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015

9

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 3

MENTAL INJURIES IN MINNESOTA

20151

1403

provides examples such as first responders collecting human
remains, or police officers repeatedly exposed to details of child
abuse. In essence, the DSM-V provides for Gillette-type"' PTSD
claims. 62 While the addition of the Gillette-type PTSD claim provides
clarity for defense lawyers who wondered if repeated exposure to
small-scale traumatic events would be covered, it might result in an
increase in compensable injuries.
Unlike previous versions, the DSM-V does not require intense
to the traumatic event.63
fear, helplessness or horror in response
Instead, the focus is on symptoms and behavior beginning after the
traumatic event occurs. The removal of intense fear, helplessness,
or horror shifts the focus from the event that caused PTSD to the
subsequent reaction, which should also concern defense lawyers.
Disproving the traumatic nature of an event is far less abstract and
expensive than disproving an individual's emotional reaction to
that event.
Another concern regarding the definition of PTSD includes
the inherent problems in using a singular, evolving source to
define PTSD. First, and perhaps foremost, by using the "most
recent" DSM to define PTSD, the Minnesota legislature has built a
degree of uncertainty into the law. While the DSM-Vwas published
in May 2013 , and a new version of the DSM will not likely be
published for many years, the next edition could feature an even
broader, more expansive definition of PTSD. As discussed, the
understanding of mental health issues is, by its very nature, a
progressive science. As mental health problems become more
accepted and as the science surrounding the diagnoses becomes
more refined, the definitions associated with mental impairments
expand to include more symptoms and triggers. Because of these
definitional expansions, perhaps even having a bad day at work
could, one day, constitute a compensable injury. At this point,
however, it is merely speculation.

60. Id.
See Gillette v. Harold, Inc., 257 Minn. 313, 101 N.W.2d 200 (1960)
61.
"Gillette injuries" refer to those that are the result of repetitive minute trauma
sustained as part of an employee's job duties. Id.
62. See Am. PSYCHIATRIc ASS'N, supra note 59.

63.
64.

See id.
See id.

65.

See Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, supra note 57.
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Another, subtler problem with relying solely on the most
recent version of the DSM to define PTSD is that the Minnesota
legislature has tied all compensable diagnoses to a manual that may
not have the definitive and authoritative weight it had previously.
For many years, the DSM was the be-all-end-all for defining and
understanding mental illness and impairments. But as mental
impairments have become more understood, the amount of
research and focus on the field increases (or, perhaps, vice versa).
In other words, there is now competition in the diagnostic
marketplace, which naturally creates competing assessments. To
this point, the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) recently
withdrew its support of DSM-V In support of its withdrawal, the
NIMH, the largest funding agency for mental health research, cited
the "lack of validity" and the fact that DSM-V diagnoses are not
based on "any objective laboratory measure."" And, while the
disagreements between NIMH and the American Psychiatric
Association may seem inconsequential, it does reflect a potential
problem for PTSD diagnoses in Minnesota workers' compensation
claims. Given the legislature's reliance on the DSM and the
possibility that the manual's authority is weakening, there could be
circumstances where a legitimate, objective diagnosis of PTSD may
not comport with the definition set forth in DSM-V This dilemma
will be further complicated if more organizations and doctors
follow the NIMH's approach and break from the definitions
contained in the DSM. In time, there may be varying, equally valid
and legitimate definitions of PTSD from multiple organizations.
Compensation judges, however, will have their hands tied because

66. See, e.g., Douglas A. Hass, Could the American Psychiatric Association Cause
You Headaches? The DangerousInteraction Between the DSM-5 and Employment Law, 44
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 683, 683 (2013) ("Since its first publication in 1952, the [DSM]
has long served as the primary reference for ... state and federal courts and
government agencies ....");Cia Bearden, Note, The Reality of the DSM in the Legal
Arena: A Proposition for Curtailing Undesired Consequences of an Imperfect Tool, 13
Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 79, 81 (2012) ("[I]n the legal sphere, the [DSM] is
regularly relied upon by attorneys and referenced by courts in judicial
proceedings.").
67. See Thomas Insel, Director's Blog: Transforming Diagnosis, NAT'L INST.
MENTAL HEALTH (Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/director/2013

/transforming-diagnosis.shtml.
68. Id.
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the Minnesota legislature has limited the definition of PTSD to that
69
contained in the DSM.
This potential dilemma, moreover, contravenes the public
policy considerations at the heart of workers' compensation laws
and confuses the issues at hand: it shifts the focus from
compensating injured workers to satisfying certain diagnostic
criteria from one particular source. In an attempt to provide clarity
and consistency by limiting the definition of PTSD to the DSM, the
legislature may have complicated litigation surrounding PTSD
claims.
V.

DEFENDING

PTSD CLAIMS

For attorneys practicing workers' compensation defense, the
statutory changes do contain elements that will be useful when
handling and defending mental-mental claims. To begin, the
statute explicitly excludes mental impairments resulting "from a
disciplinary action, work evaluation, job transfer, layoff, demotion,
promotion, termination, retirement, or similar action taken in
7 °
good faith by the employer. O These exclusions appear to be the
legislature's attempt to state that the stresses associated with
normal, unavoidable work events do not give rise to compensable
mental-mental claims; having a bad day will not be compensable.
Additionally, compensable mental-mental claims are limited to
PTSD. 71 Depression, anxiety, and other mental impairments will
not be compensable. This, too, limits the scope of the new statute.
Claims alleging PTSD are far less common than claims alleging
consequential depression related to an underlying physical injury.
It is also important to understand how mental-mental injuries
are incorporated into the statute. As indicated above, occupational
72
disease has been expanded to include mental impairments. The
legislature did not create a new injury classification with new
procedures and defenses. Rather, it has expanded the existing
definition of occupational disease to include certain mental
impairments. As a result, defense attorneys will be able to handle
mental-mental claims just as they have conventional physical

69.

See MINN.

STAT.

§ 176.011, subdiv. 15(d) (2014); AM.

PSYCHIATRic ASS'N,

supra note 59, at 271.

§ 176.011, subdiv. 15(a).

70.

MINN. STAT.

71.
72.

See id. § 176.011, subdiv. 15(d).
See id. § 176.011, subdiv. 15.
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injuries. For example, defense attorneys can still point to a
preexisting condition, activities wholly unrelated to the employee's
work activities, or intentional third-party acts when denying mentalmental claims. Furthermore, given that PTSD is often tied to a
traumatic event like a shooting or an assault, the intentional thirdparty act defense may have newfound usefulness. Thus, when
contemplating the increased exposure, it is important to remember
that the scope of the new law is narrow, and most defense attorneys
already have a good handle on the best defenses to mental-mental
claims.
Beyond the statutory defenses, perhaps the most useful tool to
defense attorneys is the DSM-V itself, which identifies differential
diagnoses that are separate and distinct from PTSD.73 For example,
DSM-Vpositions acute stress disorder and PTSD as separate mental
impairments: the symptom patterns of the two diagnoses are
similar, but acute stress disorder lasts anywhere from "[three] days
to [one] month following a traumatic event," while PTSD lasts
much longer. 74 In other words, acute stress disorder is that
temporary feeling of anxiety and unease you have following a major
event, while PTSD is a much more significant impairment.
Similarly, the DSM-V highlights adjustment disorders as a type of
impairment that is similar, but different from PTSD. With an
adjustment disorder, the symptom pattern of PTSD occurs, yet the
underlying stressor does not need to rise to the requisite level
needed for a PTSD diagnosis. 76 Where PTSD is the response to a
traumatic event, adjustment disorders are the result
of everyday
77
stressors, such as getting divorced or getting fired.
Finally, the DSM-V points out that not all psychological
reactions to extreme stressors or traumatic events are necessarily
PTSD. 78 PTSD is a specific chronological impairment whereby
certain identifiable symptoms only occur following exposure to a
traumatic event." It is possible that other psychological
impairments, such as dissociative disorder, may be triggered by a
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traumatic event.80 In those circumstances, however, the employee
would not suffer from PTSD and, as a result, would not have a
compensable mental-mental claim.
Understanding these differential diagnoses will help defense
attorneys identify non-compensable mental-mental claims. And
while it is unlikely that defense attorneys will turn into mental
health experts overnight, having a solid understanding of DSM-V
will at least help them point psychiatrists and psychologists in the
right direction when drafting an independent psychological
examination letter.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the inclusion of some mental-mental claims, Minnesota
workers' compensation law has moved into the twenty-first century.
Gone is the outdated notion that work-related mental impairments
are not compensable injuries. While the inclusion of mental-mental
injuries may result in more claims and increased financial exposure
for employers and insurers, it is still possible for attorneys to
effectively handle and defend these new claims. There are, of
course, some unknown aspects of the new law, and there will likely
be increased litigation for a few years as the courts decide the
practical scope of the law. But, these unknowns are to be expected
with any new legislation and should not give attorneys practicing
workers' compensation law too much pause-at least not yet. True
concern should be reserved for when a court takes mental-mental
claims in a wholly unexpected direction, opening up the mentalmental floodgates to anyone who has had a bad day. From this
perspective, Donald Rumsfeld's quote, despite its clumsy syntax,
has great erudition and relevance.
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